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ABSTRACT 
The insider threat is potentially the most damaging and costly threat to organisations, and 
while there is a considerable body of literature aimed at understanding this phenomenon, we 
contend that the theories contained in such literature are most beneficial if they can be utilised 
in a way that is contextually relevant. Our research, and this paper, is specifically focussed on 
developing and improving this contextual validity. We find that malicious acts arising from 
disgruntlement are perceived as very real problems in practice. We also present a current list 
of non-malicious aberrant behaviours and show how they rank in relative seriousness to one 
another. Given that the primary motivation for conducting this study is the view that reliance 
on the traditional conceptualisation of a boundary or perimeter is no longer viable, our 
essential contribution lies in devising a series of vignettes that empirically reflect this current 
contextual validity. 
Keywords: Insider Threat, Malicious Behaviour, Non-malicious Behaviour, Computer 
Abuse, Data Mobility, Shadow IT. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the modern networked world, replete with massive amounts of data, one of the greatest 
economic threats facing organisations is information loss inflicted by actors either from 
within or external to the organisation. While much attention has been paid in the past to the 
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external threats, the internal threat is gaining ground in the minds of those concerned with 
information security. Recent industry reports have variously described it as a ‘huge problem’ 
(van Kessel and Allan 2014) or indeed a ‘relentless problem’ (Vorometric 2015) and a 
problem that is becoming ‘more serious’ (Trendmicro 2014). Both the FBI and Homeland 
Security have warned that “disgruntled and former employees pose a significant cyber threat” 
(FBI and DHS 2014) and one of the world’s most respected information security training 
organisation reports that 74% of companies are concerned about insider threats (SANS 
Institute 2015). 
Notably, this concern about the insider threat is not confined to industry and consultant-led 
reports. Within the academic field the insider threat has been described as the greatest threat 
of all (Warkentin and Willison 2009), a significant threat to organisations (D'Arcy and 
Devaraj 2012; D'Arcy and Hovav 2009; D'Arcy et al. 2009), and a major concern (Siponen 
and Vance 2010). In fact Vance et al (2013) open their paper by stating that a persistent 
problem in information security is insiders who abuse the trust placed in them. Furthermore, 
when proposing a research agenda for the Behavioural Information Security field, Willison 
and Warkentin (2013) assert that insider computer abuse has the greatest potential for loss and 
damage to the employer and they call for research that considers the thought process of the 
offender. This current study is motivated by a desire to contribute towards answering this call. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As part of the Behavioural Infosec research field, our overall aim is to contribute to a greater 
understanding of non-compliant information security behaviour in the organisational context. 
Regarded as being crucial for organisations that want to leverage their human capital 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010), one of the theories used to examine non-compliant behaviour that has 
proven popular in prior studies is Deterrence theory. With its origins in the works of early 
classical philosophers and subsequent criminological works it was introduced to the 
Browne et al./ Contextualising the Insider Threat: A Mixed Method Study 
Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016 3 
mainstream IS literature with Straub’s seminal (1990) study, showing that security 
countermeasures had a deterrent effect on intentional system misuse. While subsequent 
studies extended the theory to show that awareness of these countermeasures was in itself a 
deterrent to such behaviour (D'Arcy et al. 2009) others have sought to combine the theory 
with other theories. For example in (Siponen and Vance 2010) where Neutralisation Theory 
was incorporated, the deterrent effects of all forms of sanctions were rendered insignificant, 
and in (Barlow et al. 2013) only one of the three neutralisations examined were found to have 
a  significant effect on intention to violate policy. Similarly with the inclusion of Ethics 
theory, it has been shown that, with the exception of sabotage, codes of ethics have no effect 
on computer abuse judgements and intentions (Harrington 1996) while (Hu et al. 2011) point 
to the importance of the level of self control among potential offenders. Social Bond Theory 
has also been used to examine aberrant behaviour (Cheng et al. 2013) with varying results 
between an individual’s bond to co-workers and to the organisation.  In summary, when 
viewed as a whole, deterrence based studies have to date presented disparate findings. There 
are several methodological approaches suggested for addressing this, one of which is to 
measure perceived the benefits of the behaviour in question in conjunction with perceived 
sanctions (D'Arcy and Herath 2011).  
With a view to examining the impact of both sanctions and expected benefits of aberrant 
behaviour we have therefore chosen Rational Choice Theory (RCT) as the basis for our 
theoretical model (Nagin and Paternoster 1993; Paternoster and Simpson 1996).  Commonly 
applied in criminal behaviour studies, a succinct description of the theory is available in 
(McCarthy 2002) where it is described as: 
“The rational choice approach to crime assumes that crime can be understood as if people 
choose to offend by using the same principles of cost-benefit analysis they use when selecting 
legal behaviours.” 
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In addition to the dual focus on both the negative and positive consequences of human choice-
making, our selection of the theory follows the logic expressed in (Paternoster and Simpson 
1996; Vance and Siponen 2012) that RCT is particularly appropriate for explaining crimes of 
a so-called “white-collar” nature involving a deliberate decision processes. Given that the 
focus of this study is insider deliberate actions, it therefore seems appropriate to use RCT as a 
fulcrum around which to base our theoretical model.  
However, simply adopting a theory or introducing additional constructs to existing theories is 
not sufficient. We also need to consider how we operationalise these models, what artefacts 
the measurement instruments contain and how we can make them relevant using empirical 
means. Effectively we need ensure that they are contextually relevant. 
CONTEXTUALISATION 
This paper considers contextualisation from two perspectives, namely the position of the 
research in the overall body of research and the real world setting that it concerns.  
Firstly, at its most basic level contextualisation refers to where within the IS security threat 
landscape the research is situated. Loch et al (1992) identified four dimensions of Information 
Systems Security, which was subsequently expanded on by Willison and Warkentin (2013) 
when they described a continuum of internal violations, ranging from passive non-volitional 
non-compliance, to intentional malicious computer abuse. In excluding passive or accidental 
actions of employees, this study is firmly placed in the volitional / intentional sphere. Thus 
the word “intentional” takes on a critical importance and it is crucial to understand that this 
includes both non-malicious as well as malicious actions.  
Secondly, contextualisation also concerns the real world setting in which we apply our 
research, recognising that the fundamental nature of that world changes over time. In terms of 
external threats prior studies have focussed on the technical aspects of information security 
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designed to prevent or detect what could be described as intruders (Cavusoglu et al. 2005; 
Cavusoglu et al. 2009; Lee and Larsen 2009; Yue and Cakanyildirim 2007). Much of the 
internal threat based literature has dealt with issues like inappropriate use of organisational 
systems (Liao et al. 2009) or inappropriate accessing of information by employees (Hovav 
and D'Arcy 2012). What these studies have as a common denominator is the way in which 
they conceptualise information security – as something that can be protected within an 
organisational boundary.  
However this reliance on the traditional conceptualisation of a boundary or perimeter is no 
longer viable in the modern networked world (Edwards 2013; Rebollo et al. 2012; Zissis and 
Lekkas 2012). In today’s world of tech-savvy employees, data mobility and flexible working 
arrangements, employees’ technology demands are increasingly being met by a multitude of 
providers, ultimately giving rise to an information ecosystem that is far removed from the 
traditional organisational boundaries.  
Such is the rate of the change in the modern world that even language cannot keep pace. 
Terms like ‘The Cloud’, ‘BYOD’ and the ubiquitous use of the word ‘apps’ have entered our 
everyday lexicon, and connote an idea of data and information mobility. Further descriptions 
such as; ‘Stealth IT’, ‘Workaround Systems’ and ‘Feral Systems’ (Fürstenau and Rothe 2014; 
Silic and Back 2014), emphasise the lack of agreed definitions but also point to the 
relentlessly changing nature of the way we work.  
For example, Nasuni (2014) relates the change of emphasis to the availability of technology 
and a corresponding “culture of convenient, ‘always on’ access to information” and Schalow 
et al. (2013) argue that the blurring of work and personal life boundaries is nothing new but is 
driven by the consumerisation of Information Technology. In fact Banham (2015) suggests 
that embracing this trend is imperative, primarily because of its inevitability.  
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This desire to embrace non-institutional based information solutions is not new however.  
More than thirty years ago, using an analogous term “end-user computing” (EUC), Alavi and 
Weiss (1985) warned of the organisational risk of what they describe as “a rapidly growing 
and irreversible phenomenon”, or as  Doll and Torkzadeh (1988) put it “one of the most 
significant phenomena to occur in the information systems industry”.  
Whatever the reasons for the change in the relationship between technology and work, the 
reality is that a common element of the technological behavioural practices that are now in 
vogue involves greatly increased dispersion of data and information outside the traditional 
perimeter of the organisation. The literature and the discussion above also indicate that 
attempting to put a label on this paradigm shift is problematic and so we defer to Silic and 
Back (2014) and adopt their language in describing the new IS context as including “all 
hardware, software or any other solutions used by employees which are not approved by the 
IT department.” The next logical step then is asking to what extent previously used 
instruments for testing our behavioural theories are still relevant in this new IS context, and it 
is the resulting measurement instruments that the remainder of this paper concerns itself with. 
METHODOLOGY 
Approach 
In acknowledging the debate that exists in the information systems field about the relative 
importance of rigour and relevance in research, Siponen and Vance (2014) caution against the 
use of research instruments that are out of touch with practice. They suggest a number of 
guidelines for instrumentation design that are intended to improve practical relevance of 
research in information security without any loss in rigour, and point out that most existing 
studies meet less than half of their proposed recommendations – a deficiency that we are 
addressing in this and future research.  
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However what is of primary concern to this particular paper are their primary guidelines; that 
studies should measure specific violations rather than an abstract representation of violations, 
and that these should be violations that are deemed important by those practicing in the field 
In order to adhere to these primary recommendations, three approaches are suggested (1) 
basing topics on a list obtained from literature and getting practitioners to rank them, (2) 
developing multiple scenarios and getting comments from practitioners or (3) using a belief 
elicitation technique (Limayem and Hirt 2003) to ask practitioners what their greatest 
concerns are (Siponen and Vance 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Research Method and Objectives 
Our approach has been a combination of all three. In the first instance, a review of the 
literature was undertaken to establish a baseline of offences with potential relevance. These 
formed the basis for developing an interview protocol used to conduct a series of expert 
‘semi-structured’ interviews. However, being cognisant of the sensitive nature of the subject 
matter and the potential reticence of respondents to reply to direct questioning, on occasions 
the protocol was deviated from during the interview process. The interviews were then 
analysed and the principal findings were further examined, for ranking, via a survey 
instrument using a separate cohort of information security professionals.  
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Interviews 
The Linkedin social networking site was used to “connect” with a number of information 
security professionals. Their selection was random but was governed by two criteria (a) that 
they were senior professionals currently working in information systems security and (b) that 
their roles spanned a number of different industries. In order to manage this process, the 
search for connections was conducted among the membership of the Irish chapter of ISACA.  
It was important to the validity of the study that a comprehensive cross-section of opinions 
was elicited and so two internationally active security consultants were also included in the 
expert pool to expand the breadth of organisational types in the sample. 
Initially, invitations to participate were e-mailed to 19 individuals and interviews were 
commenced as soon as the first acceptance was received. The interview protocol was made up 
of a series of six primary questions designed to determine the interviewees opinion on (a) 
what type of actual actions of employees give them cause for concern; (b) if there are specific 
IS policies or standards in their organisation targeted at employees; (c) if the interviewees had 
to deal with many security incidents involving insiders and examples thereof; (d) why 
employees might break the rules even when they know they exist; (e) the arguments 
employees use to defend their actions and (f) if there are any screening measures used in the 
hiring of new employees. 
Interviews were analysed immediately after completion and it was decided to cease 
interviewing new subjects when data saturation was reached. Defined as the point at which 
any additional data provides few, if any, new information or suggests new themes (Saunders 
et al. 2012) or incremental learning is minimal (Eisenhardt 1989), this occurred after 9 
interviews. This was not considered surprising given the design and purpose of the interviews 
was to elicit opinions from experienced practitioners on their greatest concerns about 
employee behaviour. 
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Name Organisation Description Job Title 
TechCo Software application development Global Head of Information Security 
ScienCo Multinational scientific manufacturing  Senior IS Infrastructure Manager 
PackCorp Packaging multinational Group Information Security Officer 
LeisCorp Gaming multinational Information Security Manager 
Consult1 Information Security Consultant Owner  
FinInst Banking Chief Information Security Officer 
MajorCo Manufacturing & Distribution multinational Head of Information Security 
BankCo Banking VP Information Security, IT Risk & Controls 
Consult2 Security Consultant Owner 
Table 1. Interviewee Demographic Details 
In general, interviewees opined that the insider threat was a major issue but initially 
equivocated on whether malicious behaviour was of significance.  On the subject of non-
malicious behaviours, the majority opinion was that factors like convenience, the trend 
towards a data mobility culture and the fact that there are now more employees who believe 
they are ‘tech-savvy’ contributes to the problem. A flavour of some of the comments in this 
regard is shown in Table 2 below.  
Type Reason Comment 
Non-
Malicious 
Tech Savvy “We implemented a block of all cloud storage and then we found that people used 
the TOR network to bypass our web filter, so that they can still get to the web 
version of Dropbox” (TechCo) 
“I worked with one company and the HR manager was very proud that she was 
backing up all the HR and payroll files every night onto a USB stick. I said ‘very 
good and do you store that in your fire-proof safe or do you keep it securely off-
site’ and she says ‘oh no it’s kept securely off-site’ and I went ‘very good and 
how do you do that?’ and she went ‘well I put it in my gym bag and I bring it 
home with me every day’”  (Consult 1) 
Convenience [On the dangers of free wifi – specifically in Boston Logan Airport] “It’s 
notorious. So you see something that says “Massport free Wi-Fi” and you go for 
it – next thing you’ve bought a lawnmower in Utah. It’s bananas, right? And it’s 
constant.” (ScienCo) 
“You might have guys in all parts of the organisation, not just in the IT 
department, but in a branch somewhere who’ll just say … ‘Ah look, I don’t need 
to use that, sure I’ll just use wi-fi or whatever’  so that’s a huge thing”  (FinInst) 
Data 
Mobility 
“As email has proliferated, as people have gotten their own email addresses, 
people are still sending stuff to their personal email address when they shouldn’t 
be doing so” (MajorCo) 
“You can break into three worlds: Personal email, social media and storage 
websites. They are your threats.” (LeisureCo) 
Table 2. Examples of ‘non-malicious’ internal security violations 
At this point it is worth noting that literature and research methodologies would have us 
believe that enquiries of this kind may be limited in what they can determine, due to the 
sensitive nature of the topic (Kotulic and Clark 2004) and the reluctance of interviewees to let 
Browne et al./ Contextualising the Insider Threat: A Mixed Method Study 
Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016 10 
outsiders study their potential security issues (Posey et al. 2011). Therefore, it was anticipated 
that the findings of this section of the study would only relate to non-malicious behaviours. 
Crucially however, we also found that malicious behaviour was a major concern for those 
interviewed. Malicious harming of the organisation was alluded to several times during nearly 
every interview, with perimeter security being a major issue. Traditionally, perimeter security 
has been regarded as a concern relating to external actors but now it also forms part of the 
insider threat. Specifically, employees ‘stealing’ information, data, and intellectual property 
represent a real concern, particularly in the context of the disgruntled or displaced employee.  
Malicious Personal Gain “The insider threat has probably moved away from misuse to using the 
computers for personal gain or for fraud. I think that’s going to become even 
more likely over time”(PackCorp) 
“We have had security breaches with either staff leaving the company and 
they’ve taken confidential information with them like customer lists and stuff 
like that, or in one or two cases where staff have stolen source code and 
intellectual property … and in one case went to set up their own company 
doing the same type of business, using the source code they had taken … or 
taken source code from an internal system that the company was using … 
and then the staff member gave it to his brother who set up a company 
providing this software as a business solution”(Consult2) 
“When people have decided to leave an organisation or the organisation has 
decided to let them go, that they send home a brain-dump of a lot of their 
stuff - so I’ve come across instances of source code, of strategic plans, of 
people’s CVs and it’s all around the topic that people are preparing 
themselves for in their next life” (BankCo) 
Disgruntlement “there will always be disgruntled employees and it’s something we are aware 
of … when we go with our quarterly updates to the board the disgruntled 
employee mightn’t be at the top of the list like it would have been 3-4 years 
ago, but it’s still a risk” (FinInst) 
“… you always have the disgruntled leaver factor and that is genuinely an 
issue … now people who don’t have privileges on systems, it’s not so much a 
big deal, because there’s not so much damage they can do but … y’know the 
other concern is people deliberately stealing information. So it’s one thing to 
send your information to your own Gmail account, but the fact that we now 
have things like oneDrive for Business and you can fire up all of these files to 
your oneDrive account - pull them down when you get home, have no 
traceability on them … even if we had Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software 
… if DLP was looking specifically at email it wouldn’t show up this … and if 
you go off to a competitor and you are a sales or marketing person, you’re 
pulling that proprietary information or even planning information for the 
following financial year and bringing it to your competitors … or to your 
new employers” (MajorCo) 
Table 3. Examples of ‘malicious’ internal security violations 
The difficulty in obtaining complete and open responses in information security studies has 
long been problematic (Crossler et al. 2013; Guo et al. 2011). Bearing this in mind it was 
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therefore not surprising that when pressed on malicious threats, interviewees indicated that it 
was a real concern but in general showed a certain amount of reticence in divulging details or 
examples. This may be because asking people responsible for information security about what 
concerns them in relation to employee behaviours is effectively something that requires more 
than a modicum of self-reflection and self-criticism, if they are to answer honestly. 
Paradoxically this seems to be more pronounced in relation to non-malicious behaviours, 
presumably because practitioners feel that they should be able to prevent these from 
happening. Therefore, in an effort to get a better understanding of the relative importance of 
each of the behaviours, rather than simply confirming that they exist, a logical next step was 
to introduce a layer of anonymity. This formed the second part of our “contextual” 
investigation – using an anonymised survey instrument.   
 Mini - Survey 
A very parsimonious questionnaire was prepared which contained, in addition to some 
demographic questions, a list and brief description of 11 insider threats (derived from the 
findings of the previously conducted interviews). These were exclusively of the type 
categorised as ‘non-malicious’ – a research strategy that was adopted because what was being 
sought from respondents was a ranking of the seriousness of offences and it was assumed that 
all malicious acts would be regarded as extremely serious. The 11 offences offered for rating 
are shown in Table 4 below.  
 Name Organisation Description 
1 Email (1) employees / contractors emailing the organisation's 
information to an unsecured email (such as their home address) in order to 
work on information off-site 
2 Email (2) contractors setting up auto-forwarding of emails to alternative email 
addresses when away from the office  
3 USB Backup employees / contractors using USB memory storage to 'backup' sensitive 
organisation data 
4 Other Mobile 
Devices 
employees / contractors using 'tablets' or 'phablets' to work on 
organisation data 
5 Social Media (1) employees / contractors using social media without approval and thus 
exposing the organisation to possible phishing attacks 
6 Social Media (2) employees / contractors publishing inappropriate or sensitive 
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Table 4. Rating Offences 
The questionnaire also contained an open-ended, free form question, requesting respondents 
to offer their own opinions on the most significant sources of insider threat behaviour. The 
survey was posted on the ISACA Ireland LinkedIn webpage and over a two-week period 
received a total of 33 responses.      
Approximately one third of the respondents were Information Security Consultants with a 
similar amount of Information Security Managers and the remainder were spread across 
General Management, Internal Audit, Risk Management and Security Analysis roles - over 70 
per cent of respondents classified their positions as senior or middle management. 
The interview instructions asked respondents to rate the “offences” on a 5-point seriousness 
scale. The instruction on seriousness was further defined as respondents’ own opinion of the 
threat, viewed from the twin perspectives of the likelihood of it occurring and the potential 
impact on the organisation if it did occur. The scale ranged from ‘Not Serious’ to ‘Extremely 
Serious’, with a midpoint of ‘Serious’.  
Combining the product of 11 offences and 33 respondents yields a total of 363 responses to 
potential insider threat behaviours. Of these, only 72 (20%) fall into the categories of “Not 
Serious” or “A Little Serious” meaning that the remaining 80% represent concerns of 
significance in the eyes of the sample surveyed. Overall, the number of respondents that rated 
the offences as serious was relatively evenly spread across the offence categories. However, 
when we examined the number of responses that categorised offences as “Extremely 
organisational information on social media platforms 
7 Remote Login employees / contractors installing software to enable their own 
unauthorised remote login 
8 Wi-Fi (1) employees / contractors using public unsecured or unapproved wi-fi 
networks to conduct organisation business 
9 Wi-Fi (2) employees / contractors creating their own unsecured wi-fi networks 
10 Cloud Storage employees / contractors using unauthorised online data storage services 
11 
Browsers 
employees / contractors availing of services such as the TOR network to 
circumvent access control measures 
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Serious”, a slightly different picture emerged. The most serious offence according to our 
sample is the idea of employees or contractors installing software to enable their own 
unauthorised remote login. This is followed by; employees / contractors creating their own 
Wi-Fi networks; and using services such as the TOR network to circumvent access control 
measures. Surprisingly, and contrary to popular opinion, two of the lower scores in this 
category relate to the use of tablets and “phablet” devices in the conduct of business and the 
use of unapproved social media or using social media in an inappropriate manner.  
A summary of the responses is shown in Table 5 below.  
“Offence” Not 
Serious 
A little 
Serious 
Serious 
Very 
Serious 
Extremely 
Serious (see also Table 4) 
Remote Login 1 2 2 8 20 
Wi-Fi (2) 0 6 6 5 16 
Browsers 1 6 4 6 16 
USB Backup 0 3 4 11 15 
Social Media (2) 0 4 4 12 13 
Wi-Fi (1) 2 8 2 8 13 
Cloud Storage 3 6 3 8 13 
Email (2) 1 6 4 10 12 
Email (1) 0 3 8 11 11 
Social Media (1) 1 10 5 10 7 
Other Mobile Devices 1 8 8 10 6 
Totals 10 62 50 99 142 
  72 291 
  20% 80% 
Table 5. Survey Results 
While the dataset in this survey is reasonably small, it is noteworthy that it was conducted 
among a cohort of professionals in the field of information security who, by virtue of their 
membership of the LinkedIn group, are actually operating in the field. No inducements for 
participation were offered to respondents, save for an undertaking to revert with the results of 
the survey, and so the responses are assumed to be truthful. 
The open-ended question in the questionnaire simply asked respondents to name and give a 
brief description of any other additional actions of insiders, which they believed could present 
a significant security threat. Of the 19 (55%) respondents who offered a view on this question 
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the majority related to non-malicious behaviours and mirrored some of those offered for 
ranking in the earlier section of the questionnaire. Additional non-malicious behaviours 
included the use of “Shadow IT”, “Abuse of access controls”, “not using encryption”, 
“carelessness” and “the use of screen-grab tools and unauthenticated printers”. 
Several respondents only considered this question from a malicious perspective, despite not 
being prompted to. For example one respondent cited disgruntled employees and the notion of 
Intellectual Property Plagiarists.  Others referred to employees walking out with confidential 
data or removal of data via unmonitored websites, and two of the survey respondents 
specified as concerns the downloading and sale of confidential data to competitors / black 
market and creating backdoors into the enterprise network for unapproved use. 
To summarise the data overall, the ‘non-malicious’ actions of the “insider” that our survey 
respondents deemed most serious, revolve around the mobility of data, circumventing security 
controls for convenience purposes, and using third party or open source technologies in the 
workplace.  
On the malicious side the theft of information or intellectual property was the most cited 
offence in both the interviews and mini-survey, occurring primarily with disgruntled and 
departing employees.  What was surprising was that not only was it a concern, but that 
information security professionals readily admitted that it worried them. Thus while non-
malicious behaviour of insiders has been the more popular focus for prior behavioural studies 
in this area, it is our contention that it is remiss to ignore malicious behaviours.  
Our findings clearly show that the priorities of information security professionals have 
changed with regard to the insider threat, and the fact that malicious acts of employees are 
now openly viewed as a major concern rather than the tacit acknowledgement that they 
previously received, means that academic research should do likewise. 
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Methodologically, a significant amount of such academic research has previously employed 
the use of hypothetical vignettes (Weber 1992). What this research indicates is that a new set 
of vignettes, with specifics set firmly in the domain of current security concerns in practice, is 
needed. Therefore testing our theories requires that this be reflected in our measurement 
instruments. With this in mind, and drawing on the findings from our empirical work for 
context, we have developed a series of four vignettes to be used in future studies that are 
presented in Appendix A to this paper. 
 CONCLUSION 
Although research on malicious behaviour by disgruntled employees has previously been 
called for (Crossler et al. 2013; Willison and Warkentin 2013) our study is, to the best of our 
knowledge, one of the first to put it on the research agenda using empirical methods.  
A second and equally compelling finding from this research is in relation to the types of rule 
breaking behaviour that are of greatest concern. This study clearly shows that behaviours 
examined in much of the prior literature (looking at passwords, sharing logins, sending 
inappropriate email etc) are no longer alone at the forefront in terms of importance. They have 
been replaced by behaviours concerning remote login, creation of personal wi-fi networks and 
circumventing browser controls.  
Given the argument in (Siponen and Vance 2014) that studies in this area must measure 
specific behaviours then these two findings along with the creation of the resulting vignettes 
represent significant contributions to the field. 
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APPENDIX A – SCENARIOS AND CONSISTENCY CHECK RESULTS 
1. Non-Malicious Scenarios 
 
• Remote Login (employees / contractors installing software to enable their own unauthorised remote 
login) 
Mike1 is a manager in a medium sized company and although not from an IT background, he considers 
himself to be reasonably up to date with modern technology and trends. Because of the demands of his job 
Mike1 would like to have remote access to the company’s servers so that he could work from home in the 
evenings3. He has submitted an application to the IT department to be granted this access using the 
company’s virtual private network, but he hasn’t heard back from the IT department in six months2. While 
browsing the web Mike1 discovers a website offering free remote control of any computer over the internet 
and decides to investigate. He knows that it is against the rules in his organisation to load any software on 
company computers without authorisation4 but is re-assured by glowing testimonials on the website, so 
Mike1 goes ahead and downloads the software to both his work and home computer giving himself remote 
access5.  
 
• Wi-Fi (employees / contractors creating their own unsecured wi-fi networks) 
Peter1 is a branch manager in busy company with branches nationwide. Recently the branch has expanded 
and Peter1 hired some new clerical staff, but has had difficulty arranging appropriate accommodation. 
Head-office supplied the branch with a ‘portable’ office unit but he is frustrated by the inaction of the 
Head-Office IT department in installing the necessary wiring and connections for the computers in the new 
office2. He knows that it is against company rules for anyone other than IT department personnel to install 
computer-networking equipment4 but he is worried about the upcoming end-of-year reporting 
requirements3. Previously Peter1 successfully set up his own home Wi-Fi network, so he buys the 
equipment necessary from the local computer store to extend the network wirelessly into the new office.  
Peter1 then proceeds to install the Wi-Fi network extension during his lunchtime neglecting to change the 
default password5. He is pleased to inform the staff after lunch that they are now connected in their new 
office. 
 
 
 
 
Definition of Non-Malicious 
According to Guo (2011), Non Malicious Security Violations are characterised as being: (a) intentional – 
differentiating them from accidental violations; (b) self-benefitting without malicious intent – or not intending to 
harm the company or indeed personally profit at the company’s expense; (c) voluntary – end users know they 
are breaking the rules; (d) Have the potential to cause damage or present a security risk 
1 Number of times character’s name mentioned = 4 
2 Manipulation in the story  = Impatience 
3 Motivation for the act non-malicious ?          * See definition of non-malicious below 
4 Explicit that the act is against company rules  
5 Phrase that says the act was performed by the character  
160 Wordcount 
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2. Malicious Scenarios 
 
• Disgruntlement / personal gain 
John1 has worked for Buildco plc for the past 25 years preparing bids for major construction projects. Despite 
being central to the success of the company, John1 is annoyed that he remains in middle management while 
several people he mentored are senior managers2. He has been approached by a rival company to join their 
senior management and has secretly accepted their offer. Buildco plc has strict rules around confidentiality 
whereby only senior management make the final adjustments to bids which are then not seen by anybody else. 
However, John’s1 current boss regularly asks him to help her finalise her bids. During a recent meeting, when 
his boss was called from the office for a private call, John1, who is aware of the company’s strict policy on 
confidentiality4, emailed the file that they were working on, from her computer to his contact in the rival 
construction company (and deleted the email)5, so his new prospective new employers could win the 
contract3.  
 
• Disgruntlement / personal gain II 
Tom1 has worked in the accounts department of the same company since he left school. However, despite 
being excellent at his job Tom1 hasn’t progressed significantly, continually being passed over by others with 
professional qualifications2. Early on in his career Tom1developed a habit of bringing work home in his 
briefcase and recently he has taken to uploading the details of most of his daily work to a shared cloud storage 
drive. Although he knows that this is against the company rules4, his boss has a habit of ringing him outside 
of office hours and demanding answers to questions so he feels that this rule violation is necessary. Recently, 
a rival company has approached Tom1 with a job offer, which he has accepted. However, before handing in 
his notice, he downloads all the information from the cloud storage drive to his personal laptop5, thinking 
that being armed with this information might help him to get ahead in his new job3. 
 
 
 
 
Definition of Malicious 
Guo’s (2011), characterisation of Non Malicious Security Violations can also be used to frame Malicious 
Violations by substituting “with malicious intent” for “without malicious intent” in part (b) of the definition and so 
are characterised here as: (a) intentional; (b) self-benefitting with malicious intent; (c) voluntary; (d) Have the potential to 
cause damage or present a security risk . 
In defining “with malicious intent” we take note of the fact that Guo (2011) excluded from his definition of non-
malicious acts, those acts that are unethical and benefit the end user at the organisation’s expense, and so they 
are included in the definition of malicious security violations. 
1 Number of times character’s name mentioned = 4 
2 Manipulation in the story  = Annoyance 
3 Motivation for the act malicious ?          * See definition of malicious below 
4 Explicit that the act is against company rules ? 
5 Phrase that says the act was performed by the character  
160 Wordcount 
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